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ANOTHER NOTE ON THE 
ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 
Ronald E. Beanblossom 
It is commonplace to pay homage to the ontological argument by noting that it 
is a much debated argument. Moreover, since the appearance of Malcolm's essay 
on Anselm, it is commonplace to speak of Anselm's second formulation or proof 
of the ontological argument.' I shall argue that this formulation is no more 
successful than the first. Next, I shall argue that contrary to Malcolm's claim, 
there is an appropriate use of 'possible' such that it is not self-contradictory to 
claim "God necessarily exists but it is possible God does not exist." 
I 
Malcolm correctly argues that even though contingent existence is not a per-
fection, necessary existence may be a perfection in the sense that it is superior 
to contingent existence. Indeed, God is conceived to be a being upon whom we 
are dependent for our existence but a being who is not dependent upon anything 
else for his own existence. Because of this conception, Anselm claims that God's 
existence must either be impossible or necessary. 2 Suppose God does not exist. 
Since nothing cannot produce something, if he were to begin to exist he would 
be dependent upon something else for his existence. Hence, if he does not exist 
he cannot begin to exist. On the other hand, if he does exist he cannot begin or 
cease to exist for this would again make him dependent upon something else for 
his existence. But if his existence is not contingent, then it is necessary. 
A. 1. If God does not exist, then his existence is impossible. 
2. If God does exist, then he necessarily exists. 
3. Therefore either it is impossible that God exists or God necessarily 
exists. 
Proponents of the ontological argument claim that God's existence is not 
impossible for it is neither self-contradictory nor logically absurd to assert that 
he does exist. 3 
4. It is not the case that God's existence is impossible. 
5. Therefore, God necessarily exists. 
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The fourth premise is objectionable. God's existence is impossible-given 
that he does not exist. The point is not that I claim to know this premise is false. 
Rather, I claim it is dubious. To assert that God's existence is not impossible 
assumes what is to be proven, namely, that God exists. It has been a common 
assumption on the part of proponents of the ontological argument that there is 
only one instance in which God's existence is impossible, to wit, the concept 
of God is self-contradictory. However, unwittingly, Malcolm makes explicit 
another instance in which God's existence would be impossible, namely, if God 
does not exist. Consider the concept of God; he is omnipotent, omniscient, 
omnibenevolent, creator of all things, and eternal, i.e., God necessarily never 
begins nor ceases to exist (this latter definition is consistent with God's never 
having existed). This concept of God is consistent; yet, if God does not exist, 
then God's existence would nonetheless be impossible. For if God is eternal and 
he does not exist, then he could never begin to exist, i.e., his existence would 
be impossible. "Since He cannot come into existence, if He does not exist His 
existence is impossible."4 Thus, two things would appear to make God's existence 
impossible: (a) the concept of God is self-contradictory or (b) God does not 
exist. To claim God's existence is not impossible must, therefore, presuppose 
that He does exist. 
To see more clearly the way in which the above argument begs the question, 
consider the following argument. Suppose one argues as follows: 
B. 1. If Beanblossom is thinking of the number 1, then Beanblossom is 
thinking of an odd number. 
2. It is not the case that Beanblossom is thinking of an odd number 
(e.g., Beanblossom is thinking of the number 2). 
3. Therefore, Beanblossom is not thinking of the number 1. 
The character of this modus tollens argument is that in the second premise we 
are explicitly affirming something (that Beanblossom is thinking of the number 
2) which leads us to deny that Beanblossom is thinking of an odd number. Of 
course, once we accept the premises, they jointly entail "Beanblossom is not 
thinking of the number 1." 
The same feature occurs in all modus tollens arguments in the premise which 
denies the consequent of the conditional statement. In denying the consequent 
our denial is based upon something else which, implicitly or explicitly, we have 
affirmed or denied. There must be some reason for denying the consequent of 
the conditional statement. 
Consider the argument 
C. 1. If God does not exist, then God's existence is impossible 
2. God's existence is not impossible 
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3. Therefore God exists 
What reason(s) do we have for denying the consequent of the first premise? Our 
reasons are twofold: (a) the concept of God is not self-contradictory and (b) God 
exists. To be sure the conjunction of premises 1 and 2 entail that God exists. 
But God's existence has already been presupposed; to claim God's existence is 
not impossible must presuppose that he does exist. Thus, the second formulation 
of Anselm's ontological argument does not escape a common criticism of the 
first, to wit, it begs the question. 
II 
Malcolm has claimed that many criticisms of the ontological argument rest 
upon contradictory propositions and, consequently, fail. For example, Kant's 
criticism of the ontological argument requires that the premise "God necessarily 
exists" be interpreted as a conditional statement because he wants the antecedent 
clause" ... to imply that it is possible that God does not exist. The whole point 
of Kant's analysis is to try to show that it is possible to 'reject the subject'."5 
Thus, Kant supposes that the presupposition "God necessarily exists" is equivalent 
to the conditional proposition "If God exists, then he necessarily exists." Malcolm 
proposes to make explicit in Kant's conditional proposition the possibility of 
rejecting the subject: 
"If God exists (and it is possible that He does not), then He necessarily 
exists." But now it is apparent, I think, that these philosophers have 
arrived at a self-contradictory position .... Their position is self-con-
tradictory in the following way. On the one hand, they agree that the 
proposition "God necessarily exists" is an a priori truth .... On the other 
hand, they think that it is correct to analyze the proposition in such a 
way that it will entail the proposition "It is possible that God does not 
exist." .. .it is rather the case that they are incompatible with one another! 
Can anything be clearer than the conjunction "God necessarily exists 
but it is possible that He does not exist" is self-contradictory?6 
What I shall show is that there is a sense of the term 'possible' such that it 
is not self-contradictory to assert either that "God's existence is impossible but 
it is possible that he does exist" or that "God necessarily exists but it is possible 
that he does not exist." It does seem possible that God's existence is either 
impossible or necessary. What we mean in asserting that God's existence or 
nonexistence is possible is that we do not know whether God does or does not 
exist. Thus, for example, to say that "God's existence is impossible, but it is 
possible that he does exist" is to say "God's existence is impossible, but I do 
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not know that he does not exist." 
The conjunction, "God's existence is impossible, but it is possible that he 
does exist" is not, contrary to Malcolm's claim, self-contradictory. The first 
conjunct, "God's existence is impossible," uses a logical modality. This modality 
is used because proponents of the ontological argument consider whether the 
concept of God is self-contradictory. However, the second conjunct, "it is possible 
that he does exist," uses an epistemic modality, i.e., "I do not know that God 
does not exist." Moreover, "God's existence is impossible" does not entail that 
anyone knows that God does not exist. Thus, since 'possible' is used in different 
but consistent senses, the conjunction, "God's existence is impossible, but it is 
possible that he does exist," is not self-contradictory. 
Likewise, to say that "God necessarily exists, but it is possible that he does 
not exist," is to say "God necessarily exists, but I do not know that he exists." 
From the proposition "God necessarily exists" it does not follow that "I know 
God exists" is true. If what we mean by 'possible' in the second conjunct is that 
we lack knowledge of God's existence or nonexistence, then, contrary to Mal-
colm's claim, the conjunction "God necessarily exists, but it is possible that he 
does not exist" is not self-contradictory. Though it must be acknowledged that 
this conjunction appears to be inconsistent, the apparent inconsistency is removed 
when the meaning of 'necessary' and 'possible' is made explicit. "God necessarily 
exists" uses a logical modality whereas "it is possible that he does not exist" 
uses an epistemic modality. 
Thus, there is at least one sense of the term 'possible,' a sense not dealt with 
in ordinary modal logic, which Malcolm has failed to address in his critique of 
Kant's (among others) criticism of the ontological argument. Because Malcolm 
fails to address epistemic modalities, his argument against critics of the ontolog-
ical argument is not compelling. Moreover, I have shown that Malcolm's version 
of Anselm's second formulation of the ontological argument begs the question. 
Ohio Northern University 
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